MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Use of NVA Forces in the Tet Offensive

18 February 1968

1. Based on information currently available, it can be stated that the enemy generally relied on VC main and local forces to carry out the initial phase of the Tet offensive against urban centers. NVA units were used, however, to augment VC forces in areas where VC units were either not available or were understrength.

2. The use of NVA forces was extensive in the attacks against cities in I and II Corps. The attack against Quang Tri city was apparently an exclusive NVA action. Elsewhere in I Corps, NVA units were employed with VC forces in the attacks against Hue, Danang, Hoi An and Tam Ky. In II Corps, NVA and VC units have been identified in the attacks against Kontum, Qui Nhon, Ban Me Thuot, Pleiku, Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. No NVA units have yet been identified in the attacks against provincial capitals in III Corps. The attacks in IV Corps were conducted by VC units as no NVA forces are known to exist in the corps area.

3. It is apparent that the enemy planned to use NVA units in some areas as a blocking force in support of VC units which attacked the cities. These NVA units had the mission of attacking Allied base camps away from the provincial capitals and interdicting lines of communications to prevent Allied reinforcements from reaching the cities. It is difficult, however, to assess the extent to which the enemy employed this tactic. The only firm evidence is in III Corps. Elements of the 7th NVA Division, which recently moved into Binh Duong Province, were instructed to attack the U.S. base at Lai Khe while VC forces attacked the provincial capital of Phu Cuong. Other elements of the 7th Division were undoubtedly responsible for the attacks on U.S. base camps in Binh Long and Hau Nghia Provinces and for interdicting roads into Saigon. Several U.S. base camps in I and II Corps
were also subjected to attacks by fire, but the enemy units involved in these attacks have not been identified.

4. The role and mission of the NVA Divisions operating in VC Military Region (MR) V remains unclear. Some of these Divisions were committed in the attacks against cities while others were apparently held in reserve to renew the attacks against selected targets at a later date. Elements of the two regiments of the 5th Division (95th and 18B) were committed in the attacks against cities and towns in Khanh Hoa and Puy Yen Provinces. Only one regiment (the 18th) of the 3rd NVA Division has been identified in the attacks against provincial capitals and district towns. The 18th Regiment was reportedly responsible for the attack on Phu Cat district town in Binh Dinh Province. It is possible that the other regiments (22nd and 2nd) of the 3rd Division had the mission of moving into the pacified areas of Binh Dinh Province and destroying the RD program in this area. The entire 1st NVA Division, which operates in the Central Highlands under the control of the B-3 Front, was not committed in the initial phase of the Tet offensive and was apparently held in reserve. Elements of the 1st Division have recently been engaged around Dak To and are apparently preparing for attacks against Allied bases in this area. Two regiments (1st and 3rd) of the 2nd NVA Division, which operates in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, were also apparently held in reserve by MR V. The third regiment (21st) of the 2nd Division was reportedly involved in the attacks on Tam Ky, but subsequently withdrew northward to join the remainder of the division in positions threatening Danang and Hoi An. The role of the 2nd as a reserve force to renew the attacks on Danang is inferred in the document captured in this document, a critique of the Tet offensive by MR V, refers to units of "Mr Truc" which have "returned to area K for counter-operations." The units are believed to be regiments under the 2nd Division and "K2" is presumably a cover for the Danang area.